Constructive Trust -- Fiduciary Relationship -- Bank Official and Loan Applicant by unknown
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 5 Number 2 Article 12 
2-1-1951 
Constructive Trust -- Fiduciary Relationship -- Bank Official and 
Loan Applicant 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Constructive Trust -- Fiduciary Relationship -- Bank Official and Loan Applicant, 5 U. Miami L. Rev. 316 
(1951) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol5/iss2/12 
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
two analogies. The first was to a matrimonial situation in which the court
took jurisdiction over a foreign-appointed administrator at his request as a
matter of comity. 19 The second analogy was to the federal system in which
the court voiced grave doubts that the courts in other states must give this
regardless of where they were appointed, but with the qualification that
whatever judgments might be rendered would be subject to all of the laws
of the state making the appointment including the probate law. 20 The
judgments given in these two analogies were weak because they were sub-
ject to complete review in other jurisdictions, and even in the instant case
the court voiced grave doubts that the courts in other states must give this
judgment "full faith and credit."
21
Until there is a decision by the court of last resort on this point, there
can be no settled law. Moreover, there seems to be a conflict of authority
and reasoning on this point between federal and state courts. At present,
these judgments can validly be rendered, but they are subject to complete
review by the courts of another state. As a matter of fact, if followed at all,
they will be followed by the courts of other states only as a matter of comity.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST-FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP-
BANK OFFICIAL AND LOAN APPLICANT
An applicant for a loan from a cooperative bank brought suit in equity
to obtain title to land, which a bank official had bought in his wife's name.
Through his position on the bank's security committee, he had secured, in
expressed confidence, oral information regarding the land's value, location,
and low purchase price from the applicant. A statute required two mem-
bers of the security committee to approve a written application containing
this information before a loan could be granted. The trial court dismissed
the complaint. Held, that the official holds the land under a constructive
trust for the loan applicant, as a result of having purchased it in violation of
the fiduciary relationship that existed because of the information conveyed
to him in confidence. \Varsofsky v. Sherman, 93 N.E.2d 612 (Mass. 1950).
The rule is well established that breach of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship2 will cause courts of equity to impress a constructive trust on the
profits or property gained thereby.3 r The trustee will be compelled to convey
19. Id. at 878.
20. Id. at 879.
21. Id. at 881.
1. MASS. ANN. LAws c. 170, § 26 (1948).
2. The terms fiduciary and confidential are used interchangeably; see Bogart, Con-
fidential Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 237 (1928)
(suggesting that the former term be limited to the more formal and customary rela-
tionships).
3. Yamins v. Zeith, 322 Mass. 268, 76 N.E.2d 769 (1948); Beatty v. Guggenheim
Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (1919) (Cardoza, I., "When
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the legal title to the person whose confidence he has betrayed,4 even though
he may have filed title in another's name.5  Normally he will receive the
purchase price, so that both parties are returned to their previous conditions.6
The difficulty lies in determining whether there is a relationship that, when
breached, will give rise to a constructive trust. Although the courts have
avoided exactly defining the limits within which a fiduciary relationship
will be recognized,7 certain relationships are presumed to prevent the parties
from dealing with each other as strangers at arm's length. 9 Some social,
moral, domestic, or even personal relationships are also fiduciary.'0 Ordi-
narily, however, more than mutual respect or confidence.is needed to make
a business relationship fiduciary, unless there is a reasonable belief that one
party is acting in the other's behalf instead of in his own. 1 Generally, one
will be declared a fiduciary whenever he has abused his influence or betrayed
the confidence reposed in him.1 2 Nevertheless, courts have shown a tend-
ency to limit this broad general principle by denying this relationship "be-
tween mortgagor and mortgagee, pledgor and pledgee, and. applicant for a
loan and proposed lender."' 3 It is the last named exception with which the
instant case conies into conflict.
property has bee, acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may
not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee.");
3 BOCERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 481 (1946); 3 POMEROY, EQ. JUR, § 956 (5th ed.
1941); 3 SCOTT. LAw OF TRUSTS § 462 (1939); 1 BAYrioR L. Rzv. 217 (1948); 9
BE;CH AND BAR (N.S.) 95 (1914).
4. 3 SCOTT, LAw OF TRUSTS § 462.3 (1939).
5. 3 SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 462.2 (1939).
6. Ibid.; Bogert, supra note 2; Lang v. Giraudo, 311 Mass. 132, 40 N.E.2d 707
(1942); Cann v. Barry, 283 Mass. 313, 199 N.E.2d 905 (1936).
7. Balker v. Homestead Building & Loan Ass'n, 59 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
Cann v. Barry, supra note 6.
8. Broker and principal, Spritz v. Broclton Say. Bank, 305 Mass. 170, 25 N.E.2d
155 (1940); cf. Fish v. Teninga, 330 [11. 160, 161 N.E. 515 (1928). Coadventurcrs,
Cann. v. Barry, supra note 6. Employer and employee, Hom Pond Ice Co. v. Pearson,
267 Mass. 256, 166 N.E. 640 (1929); Essex Trust Co. v. Enwright, 214 Mass. 507, 102
N.E. 441 (1913). Physician and patient, Voodbury v. Woodbury, 141 Mass. 329, 5
N.E. 275 (1886). Trustee and beneficiary, 3 POMEROY, EQ. JUn. § 956 (5th ed. 1941);
3 SCOTT, LAw OF 'T RUSTS § 462 (1939); 9 BENCH AND BAR (N.E.) 95 (1914).
9. 3 POMERO, EQ. fuR. § 956 (5th ed. 1941); 3 SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 462
(1939); see Yamins v. Zeitz, suPra note 3, 76 N.E.2d at 772; Halker v. Homestead
Building & Loan Ass'n, supra note 7, at 691.
10. Metcalf v. Ledey, Wheeler and Co., 140 Fla. 149, 191 So. 690 (1939); Hawkcs
v. Lackey, 207 Mass. 424, 23 N.E. 828 (1911); Lane v. Moore, 151 Mass. 87, 23 N.E.
828 (1890); 3 POMERoY, EQ. JUR. § 956a (5th ed. 1941).
I. Yamins v. Zeitz, supra note 3; Plumer v. Luce, 310 Mass. 789, 39 N.E.2d 961
(1942); Comstock v. Livingston, 210 Mass. 581, 97 N.E. 106 (1912).
12. Reed v. A. E. Little Co., 256 Mass. 442, N.E. 918 (1926); 3 BocER'r, TRIPSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 482 n.l (1946); accord, T]ate v. Williamson, L.R. 2 Ch. 55, (1856)
(Lord Chelmsford, L.C., "Whenever . . . confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and
the influence which naturally grows out of that confidence is abused, or the influence is
exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the person so avail-
ing himself of his position will not be permitted to retain the advantage, although the
transaction could not have been impeached if no such confidential relation has existed").
13. Carpenter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kingham, 56 Wyo. 314, 109 P.2d 463, 475
(1941); 3 BOCERT, TRUSTS AND TRISTEES § 482 (1946). But cf. Nichols v. Martin,
277 Mich. 305, 269 NAV. 183 (1936) (mortgagee held a fiduciary).
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In the few previous decisions involving misuse of information given in
loan applications,"4 emphasis has been placed on the applicant's well estab-
lished right'5 to prevent the intervention of any buyer through obtaining an
option on the property,' 6 estoppel when the applicant made no objection
to the conduct of the proposed lender until two years laster,' t and failure to
convey any new information to a loan company already negotiating for the
property for itself, in holding against the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship. Since those cases were from other jurisdictions, the court in the
present case was free to rely on analagous situations. Neither gratuitous
assistance by an old friend who later acted in his own self-interest" nor
false evaluation of machinery by an appraisor so that he could buy it for
himself,2 1 was sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship. However, the
latter holding, relied on by the lower court in the instant case, was modified
by a very recent decision 2' which followed previous holdings that brokers
in that jurisdiction are in a principal and agent relationship'22 in decreeing
a constructive trust when a broker bought for himself property which he
was employed to purchase.
While the court gave some consideration to these previous cases, in
the main it based the present decision on the broad general law23 and the
equities of the situation. It emphasized the loan applicant's request that
the matter of obtaining a loan be discussed in strictest confidence, which
implied the understanding that the bank's security officer would use the
information thus revealed only in determining whether to grant a loan on
the property.2 4  A statute"5 requires that all possible information be fur-
nished to cooperative banks and that this be carefully considered by their
security committees before any loans are granted. This serves to protect
the banks, whose customers ordinarily can furnish as security only the prop-
erty being purchased.26 It also makes it incumbent upon the prospective
borrower to reveal information which, lacking some protection, may deprive
him of the need for the loan through enabling the recipient of the infor-
mation to purchase the property for himself.
It is submitted that, in justice, customers should not be subjected to
the personal acquisitiveness of bank officials who would obtain bargains for
14. Halker v. Homestead Building & Loan Ass'n, supra note 7, at 691.
15. Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. 21, 11 AtI. 284 (1887).
16. Goldman v. Harford Road Bldg. Ass'n, 150 Md. 677, 133 Atl. 843 (1926).
17. Smith v. Harwell, 199 Ark. 757, 136 SW.2d 172 (1940).
18. Halker v. Homestead Building & Loan Ass'n, supra note 7.
19. Fletcher v. Bartlett, 157 Mass. 113, 31 N.E. 760 (1892); 4. Carpenter &
Carpenter, Inc. v. Kingham, supra note 13.
20. Salter v. Beal, 321 Mass. 105, 71 N.E.2d 872 (1947).
21. Berenson v. Nirenstein, 93 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1950).
22. Spritz v. Brokton, supra note 8.
23. See note 12, supra.
24. Warsofsky v. Sherman, 93 N.E.2d 612 (Mass. 1950).
25. ANN. LAws OF MAss. C. 170 § 26 (1948).
26. Warsofsky v. Sherman, supra note 24; Lowell Co-operative Bank v. Co-operative
Central Bank, 287 Mass. 338. 191 N.E. 921 (1934); see Greenfield Savings Bank v.
Abercrombie, 211 Mass, 252, 255, 97 N.E. 897,899 (1912).
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themselves by misusing confidential information. Public confidence, it
should be remembered, is essential to lending agencies. 27  Since statutory
prohibition 28 against loan officers taking fees, gifts, or making unsound in-
vestments21 1 serves to protect banks against unconscionable acts by their offi-
cials, it seems that the courts should make them quasi-agents of the appli-
cants dealing with the banks or in sonic other way establish a fiduciary rela-
tionship between them in every such case. The present decision could also
serve as authority for requiring officials of banks other than co-operative
banks, indeed of any lending agency that necessarily, because of statutory
requirement or otherwise, acquires confidential information regarding the
contemplated purchase, to deal honorably with those whose confidence they
hold, and to use the information only for its intended purpose.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-WIFE'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LOSS
OF CONSORTIUM DUE TO NEGLIGENT INJURY TO HUSBAND
Because of defendant employer's negligence, plaintiff's husband was
injured, suffering severe and permanent injuries to his body, as a consequence
of which plaintiff was deprived of his aid, assistance and enjoyment, spe-
cifically sexual relations. Plaintiff's husband received compensation for his
injuries pursuant to the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act,' which provides2 exclusive liability for employers.
Plaintiff brought action against defendant to recover for loss of consortium.
Trial court entered a judgment for defendant, on motion that the court
lacked jurisdiction and the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Held,
on appeal, judgment reversed for plaintiff; a wife has a cause of action for
loss of consortium due to a negligent injury to her husband. Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 71 S.Ct. 81
(1950).
Prior to the announcement of this decision, there was unanimity of
authority denying the wife a cause of action in these premises.3 On the
27. Lowell Co-operative Bank v. Co-operative Central Bank, supra note 26.
28. ANN. LAWS OF MASS. C. 170 § 43.
29. Greenfield Savings Bank v. Abercrombie, supra note 26.
1. 44 STAT. 1424 et seq., 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1946).
2. 44 STAT. 1426, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1946).
3. E.g., Tyler v. Brown-Service Funeral Homes Co., 250 Ala. 295, 34 So.2d 203
(1948): Sobolewski v. German, 32 Del. 540, 127 Atl. 49 (1924); Cravens v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922); Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192,
104 Aft. 538 (1918); Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916); Nash v.
Mobile & Ohio R.R., 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100 (1928); Tobiassen v. Polley, 96 N.J.L.
66, 114 Atl. 153 (1921); Maloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964, 8 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct.
1945); Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App. Div. 769, 270 N.Y. Supp. 534 (2d Dep't 1934).
Only one court ever had allowed the action, Hipp v. E. 1. duPont de' Nemours & Co,
182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921), and that court subsequently effectively reversed its
position, Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925);
